Volume 38
Issue 4 Fall 1998
Fall 1998

United Water New Mexico, Inc. v. New Mexico Public Utility
Commission: Why Rules Governing the Condemnation and
Municipalization of Water Utilities May Not Apply to Electric
Utilities
Thomas Smidt III

Recommended Citation
Thomas Smidt III, United Water New Mexico, Inc. v. New Mexico Public Utility Commission: Why Rules
Governing the Condemnation and Municipalization of Water Utilities May Not Apply to Electric Utilities, 38
Nat. Resources J. 667 (1998).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol38/iss4/7

This Student Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository.
For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

CASE NOTE
United Water New Mexico, Inc. v. New
Mexico Public Utility Commission:1
Why Rules Governing the

Condemnation and Municipalization
of Water Utilities May Not Apply to
Electric Utilities
ABSTRACT
Despite substantialactivity surroundingthe municipalizationof
electric utilities as a means of obtaining lower electricity prices,
when the New Mexico Supreme Courtfirst confronted a case of the
municipalizationof a private utility by condemnation it dealt with
a water and sewage utility. The court concluded that the New
Mexico Public Utility Commission had no jurisdictionover Rio
Rancho's condemnation of its local water utility. That decision,
though good for water utilities,which often serve as a means for
communities to control growth, may have detrimental effects on
some of New Mexico's electricityconsumers. Unlike waterutilities,
electric utilitiesare usually large and interconnected to numerous
other communities. When one community leaves a system, the
remaining communities will likely pay both financially and in
terms of a decrease in service quality. Without oversightfrom the
Public Utility Commission, those effects are not taken into
consideration and balanced with other concerns when deciding
when and how a community can leave a system. Las Cruces'
municipalizationof El Paso Electric's systems within its borders
could require the remaining customers to pay higher rates, a
concern that should be addressedby the Commission.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, changes in the regulation of the electric industry
and high electricity prices have prompted many cities in the United States
to consider municipalization of the private utilities that provide them with
electricity.2 Although the trend may have started as early as the 1960s,3 it

1. 910 P.2d 906 (N.M. 1996).
2. See Suedeen G. Kelly, Muniipalization ofElectricity: The Allure of Lower Ratesfor Bright
Lights in Big Cities, 37 NAT. RESOURcES J. 43 (1997). "Municipalization is the replacement of
utility service provided by an investor-owned utility (IOU) with service provided by the
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has picked up considerable steam since the beginning of this decade. As of4
1997, an estimated 40 cities were seriously considering municipalization.
Two New Mexico cities, Albuquerque and Las Cruces, have contemplated
the option of acquiring their local electric systems from the investor-owner
utilities (IOUs) that presently serve their respective areas.' With all this
activity, it is surprising that in New Mexico the first time that a municipality acquired a privately-owned public utility through condemnation was
not until 1995.6 The same instance was also the first time that the New
Mexico Supreme Court addressed the issue of municipalization of public
service utilities! However, what is even more surprising is that when the
New Mexico Supreme Court finally addressed the municipalization issue,
it did so regarding a water utility instead of an electric utility!
In United Water New Mexico, Inc. v. New Mexico Public Utility
Commission,9 the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether the New Mexico Public Utility Commission (PUC or Commission)
had jurisdiction over the City of Rio Rancho's (Rio Rancho or City)
condemnation of a privately-owned public utility which provided water
and sewage utilities to the municipality. The New Mexico legislature
expressly provided municipalities with the power to condemn privately
owned water and sewage utilities." However, it left the issue of what
power the PUC had over such proceedings open to interpretation. In
reaching its decision, the court rejected the PUC's argument that the
condemnation was substantially similar to a "sale" or "abandonment" of
the facilities warranting PUC jurisdiction." Instead, the court focused on
the difference between the voluntary nature of a sale or abandonment of a
utility and the involuntary nature of a condemnation. Based on that
municipality itself." Id. at 43. Municipalization can take a number of forms and can occur with
any type of utility. Id.
at 44-45.
3. See Sharon B. Megdal, Municipalizationof Electric Supply: A Strategyfor Bypass, 123
PUB. UTIL FORT. 22 n.1 (1989).
4. See Michael J.Doane & Daniel F. Spulber, Municipalization:Opportunismand Bypass
in Electric Power, 18 ENERGY L.J. 333,335 (1997) (citing EDISON ELECTRIc INsTiUm, STATUS
REPORT ON ELECrRiC UTury MUNIcIPAuZATION AND BYPASs AcnvmEs (4th ed. 1997)
[hereinafter EE1 STATUS REPORT 1997).
5. See id. See also Bruce W. Radford, Enlightened on EMFI FORTNIGHTLY, Feb. 1,1995, at
4.
6. See Andrew Padilla, PUC Has No Jurisdictionin Utility Case, ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 18,
1996, at M3.
7. See id.
8. United Water N.M., Inc. v. New Mexico Pub. UtiL Comm'n, 910 P.2d 906 (N.M. 1996).
9. Id.
10. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-26-1(A)(3), 3-27-2(A)(2) (Michie Repl. Pampl. 1995).
11. The New Mexico PUC has jurisdiction over the sale (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-6-12(A)(4)
(Michie Repl. Pampl. 1993) and abandonment (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-9-5) (Michie Repl.
Pampl. 1993) of public utilities.
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distinction and the fact that the PUC does not have jurisdiction over
municipal utilities,"2 the court decided that the PUC does not have
jurisdiction over the municipalization of a utility through condemnation.
The court's decision followed the legislature's intent expressed through the
statute permitting condemnation of water and sewage utilities' and
through an amendment that expressly withdrew the need for PUC
approval for the issuance of bonds used to acquire a water or sewage
utility. 4 However, the court did not expressly limit its holding to water
utilities; from its language, the decision apparently applies equally to
electric utilities.
Although the court's decision most likely reached the correct result,
its reach may be too broad. Unlike water and sewage systems which are
generally small and localized, electric transmission and distribution
systems are usually much larger and are interconnected to systems
throughout the state and throughout the nation.' There are numerous
reasons why the court's decision in United Water may not be extended to
electric utilities.16 However, if it were so extended, it could have potentially
adverse effects on the electric systems serving many parts of New Mexico.
System problems that could result from municipalization of electric utilities
can and should be addressed by the PUC. Therefore, the court should have
required the legislature to clarify the role of the PUC in the condemnation
proceeding. If the legislature then decided that the PUC should not have
jurisdiction over condemnations of water And sewage utilities, it could
have expressly clarified the Public Utility Act (PUA) 7 to obtain that result.
The New Mexico legislature made specific changes to other sections of the

12.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-3-3(E) (Michie Repl. Pampl. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1997).

13. §§ 3-26-1(A)(3) and 3-27-2(A)(2).
14. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-23-3 (Michie RepL. Pampl. 1995 & Cur. Supp. 1997).
15.

Of the more than 3,500 electric systems in the United States, the 200 largest provide

approximately 90 percent of the generating capacity. The remaining systems generally serve
as distributors. See Michael J. Doane & Paul W. Macavoy, Transmission Access Pricing and
"Non-bypassable" Competitive TransitionCharges, 37 NAT. REsOURcEsJ. 9,12 (1997). In contrast,

there are approximately 60,000 water systems in the United States. See JANICE A. BEECHER &
ANN P. LAUBACH, 1989 SURVEY ON STATE COMMISSION REGULATION OF WATER AND SEWER

SYSTEMS 4, n.2 (National Regulatory Research Inst.) (1989).
16. For example, although the court did not so expressly state, it may limit the decision
to cases involving water and sewage utilities. The New Mexico legislature may also intervene

to limit the reach of the court's decision.
17. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-1-1 to 62-15-33 (Michie Repl. Pampl. 1993).
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statutes in contemplation of Rio Rancho's condemnation" it could have
likewise clarified the PUA.
This article addresses the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision
in United Water as it relates to both water utilities and electric utilities. Part
I of the paper discusses the history of Rio Rancho's condemnation
proceedings, including how the PUC became involved and how the court
resolved the issues. Part H analyzes the court's interpretation of the
relevant statutes. It begins by considering the legal distinction between a
voluntary sale or abandonment versus an involuntary condemnation. Then
it addresses the decision in the light of the apparent legislative intent in the
area. Lastly, Part II describes the "public interest" and how it relates to the
transfer of water and sewage utilities. The focus then turns to electric
utilities in Part III and asks what impact the decision may have on the
recent trend toward municipalization in the electric utility industry. It pays
particular attention to the recent attempt by the city of Las Cruces to
municipalize its electric system through condemnation of the El Paso
Electric Company's facilities lying within Las Cruces. The paper concludes
that while the decision may be the correct one from the standpoint of the
municipalization of water and sewage utilities, the decision may have
adverse effects in the electric industry if applied to that field.
PART I. CASE HISTORY
Located northwest of Albuquerque, New Mexico, and just across
the mighty Rio Grande River, the city of Rio Rancho was, until recently, not
much more than a small suburb of the rapidly growing Albuquerque
area.1 However, in recent years Rio Rancho has become an industrial
center and residence for companies such as Intel, the computer chip
manufacturer. Lured by industrial revenue bonds and other financial

18. In 1994, the legislature provided municipalities with the power to condemn water
and sewage utilities. See §§ 3-26-1(A)(3) and 3-27-2(A)(2). In addition, after RRUC initiated the

condemnation, the legislature amended a statute removing PUC's jurisdiction over the
issuance of bonds for the purpose of acquiring utility facilities. See § 3-23-3. The amended
provision could only apply to one municipality other than Rio Rancho, which had a

population of approximately 30,000 according to the 1990 census; i.e. Clovis. The amendment
was, therefore, dose to violating the New Mexico Constitution's prohibition against special
legislation. N.M. CotST. art. IV, § 4. Interview with Lee Huffman, Comm'n Counsel, New
Mexico Pub. Util. Comm'n, in Santa Fe, N.M. (Oct. 24,1996).
19. The population of Albuquerque is growing at about twice the national average.

However, the west side (including Rio Rancho) is growing twice as fast as the rest of the city.
See Nancy Traver, Go West-Albuquerque, And Has It Ever, N.M. BUSINESS J., Nov. 1997, at 31.
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incentives," Intel, Gateway 2000, Sumitomo Sitix Silicon, Fulcrum Direct,
Intuit, Sun Healthcare and other large corporations have brought thousands of jobs to the Albuquerque and Rio Rancho area.21 Higher wages and
increased opportunities in service-related fields created a flood of people
into Rio Rancho and created a city out of what was until recently little more
than a community. ' In 1994 Rio Rancho was the fastest growing small city
in the United States.'
In the arid southwestern landscape of the New Mexican desert,
sudden increases in population growth can put tremendous pressure on an
already strained water supply. In Rio Rancho's case, the population growth
was coupled with a dramatic increase in water use by the incoming
industrial manufacturing sector.2 Perhaps because the growing community was putting additional stress on its already jealously hoarded water,'
Rio Rancho decided to take control of its water and sewage services. In
1994 the residents of Rio Rancho decided by an overwhelming majority

20. See Don Clark, New Mexico Gets Huge Intel Plant,S.F. CHRON., Apr. 1,1993, at C1.In
1995, Sandoval County approved an $8 billion industrial revenue bond for Intel Corp. to
expand and revamp its Rio Rancho chip-making plant. It was the largest industrial revenue
bond in U.S. history. See In Brief,THE DENVER POST, Sept. 23,1995, at Dl.
21. See Kelly Matthews, We're In Good Shape and May Be Getting Better, N.M. Bus. J., Nov.
1997, at 25; Gatewray 2000 Economic Win, ALBUQUERQUE J., Aug. 27, 1997, at A4; Sherri Chunn,
Comdex Provides A Look Ahead, ALBUQUERQUE J., Nov. 24,1997, at A2; Rory McClannahan,
Fulcrum Direct Receives $4 Million To Expand Operations,ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 19,1996, at
West Side 1; Intel Expansion PlansTop State Business News, ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 28,1997, at
D12. Intel alone has brought nearly 7,000 jobs to the area. See John J.Lumpkin, Intel Plans
2,000 Hires,ALBUQUERQUE J., Mar. 7,1997, at Al. In addition, Intel jobs pay nearly twice the
New Mexico average salary. See Dinah Zeiger, Water Decision Allows Intel To Expand: Big
Employer Gets Most of Its Request, DENVER POST, June 12, 1994, at B4. For every job Intel
provides, an estimated nine jobs are created in support services. See Ralph Odenwald, A Sweet
Year Is Predictedfor the ConstructionIndustry, N.M. Bus. J., Feb. 1993, at 28.
22. The population of Rio Rancho grew from 10,000 to 46,000 between 1981 and 1995. See
Martin F. Nolan, An Intel Town Comes of Age On The Mesa, BosnON GLOBE, Oct. 9,1995, at 3.
As of 1995, Rio Rancho was the sixth largest city in New Mexico. See id.
23. In the decade ending in 1990, the population of Rio Rancho grew at a rate of more
than 239 percent, making it the fastest growing "small city" in the United States. See Leah Beth
Ward, Atop A Mesa, A City Just Grows and Grows, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,1993, at H1.
24. Intel uses more than 4 million gallons of water a day in its manufacturing process.
See Paul Logan, Intel Uses 4.8 Million Gallonsof Water Daily, ALBUQUERQUE J., Aug. 25,1995,
at Metro Plus 1. For a more complete history of Intel's water use and water permit
applications, see Susanne Hoffman-Dooley, DeterminingWhat is in the PublicWelfare in Water
Appropriationsand Transfers: The Intel Example, 36 NAT. RESOURcES J.103 (1996).
25. Albuquerque and the surrounding area were already depleting the local aquifer
before Intel arrived. See Michael Hartranft, Aquifer CrisisMay Hit By 2020, ALBUQUERQUE J.,
Jan. 31,1995, at Al.
26. Eighty-four percent of the voters were in favor of acquiring the utility. See Brief of the
City of Rio Rancho at 2, United Water N.M., Inc. v. New Mexico Pub. Util. Comm'n, 910 P.2d
906 (N.M. 1996) (Nos. 23151,23264) [hereinafter City's Brief].
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to acquire, by whatever legal means necessary, the local privately owned
water and sewage utility, the Rio Rancho Utility Corporation (RRUC).'
A. Condemnation Proceedings
After negotiations with RRUC failed to reach an agreeable sale
price for the water and sewage systems and related assets (Systems),' Rio
Rancho initiated condemnation proceedings against the utility?' On
December 15,1994, the City amended its complaint to include a request for
the immediate possession of the Systems.31 After a three day hearing on the
issue of the City's right to immediate' possession, at which RRUC
vigorously contested the condemnation, the district court granted the City
possession of the water and wastewater systems, effective June 30, 1995.m
The district court, in issuing its decision, explicitly declined to rule on
questions raised by both RRUC and the City regarding the applicability of
the PUA and the jurisdiction of PUC.s
Based on the district court's order, RRUC and the City reentered
negotiations and agreed upon a "just compensation" price of $72.5 million
(Stipulation)?, The district court approved the stipulated amount, 7 and on
June 30, 1995, the City took possession of the Systems.38 RRUC retained
title, however, and the Stipulation was subject to certain conditions

27. See Padilla, supranote 7.
28. After the initial proceedings giving rise to this case, the utility changed its name to
United Water N.M., Inc. For consistency, the courts have continued to refer to it as RRUC. See
United Water, 910 P.2d at 907, n1. This article will do the same.
29. New Mexico statute required Rio Rancho to negotiate to attempt to reach an
agreeable sale price. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41A-1-4 (Michie Repl. Pampl. 1994).
30. See City's Brief, supra note 26, at 2.
31. See The City of Rio Rancho's Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Request for Stay at
7, United Water N.M., Inc, v. New Mexico Pub. Util. Comm'n, 910 P.2d 906 (N.M. 1996) (No.
23151) [hereinafter City's Petition).
32. The term "immediate" in this context refers to the City's right to possess and operate
the Systems before the issue of just compensation has been resolved and before title has been
transferred to the City.
33. See United Water N.M., Inc. v. New Mexico Pub. Util. Comm'n, 910 P.2d 906,909 n.4
(N.M. 1996).
34. See id. at 908.
35. See Response of Pub. UtiL. Comm'n in Opposition to, and Motion to Dismiss, Petition
for Writ of Mandamus and Request for Stay at 6, United Water N.M., Inc. v. New Mexico Pub.
Util. Comm'n, 910 P.2d 906 (N.M. 1996) (No. 23151).
36. See Costs of Utility Takeover Rise, ALBUQUERQUE J., Nov. 28,1995, at 4. See also Final
Order, Case No. 2623, New Mexico Pub. Util. Comm'n (available at 1995 WL 769932) at 10,
Record at 1061,1070, United Water N.M., Inc. v. New Mexico Pub. Util. Comm'n, 910 P.2d
906 (N.M. 1996) (Nos. 23151, 23264) [hereinafter Final Order).
37. See United Water, 910 P.2d at 908.
38. See id.
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precedent." As part of the Stipulation, all proceedings with government
agencies had to be resolved prior to the transfer of title, including a
resolution of PUC's jurisdiction and approval of the matter. If the
conditions precedent were not satisfied by October 30,1995, the Stipulation
would expire.4°
B. The Commission Proceedings
The PUC first entered the fray on January 27,1995, when RRUC
filed for a declaratory order with the Commission.41 According to the PUA,
the Commission regulated RRUC, a privately-owned public utility.'
Therefore, RRUC required PUC approval before it could discontinue water
and sewage services to Rio Rancho.' RRUC filed the declaratory order
seeking clarification of certain issues regarding Commission jurisdiction
over the condemnation and any approvals RRUC would be required to
obtain before lawfully complying with the court order granting Rio Rancho
the right to immediate possession." The City opposed the RRUC petition
for declaratory judgment and any action by the Commission on the matter
of the condemnation." The City argued that its constitutional and statutory
eminent domain power' and the district court's comprehensive authority
over condemnation superseded any power the Commission might derive
through the PUA.47 The Commission denied Rio Rancho's motion to
dismiss for two reasons.

39. See City's Petition, supra note 31, at 11.
40. See City's Brief, supra note 26, at 2.
41. See United Water, 910 P.2d at 908. The filing commenced NMPUC Case No. 2623. Id.
42. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-3-3(E) (Michie Repl. Pampl. 1993 & Cur. Supp. 1997).
43. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-6-12(A)(4) and 62-9-5 (Michie RepL. PampL 1993).
44. See City's Petition, supra note 31, at 7-8.
45. See id. at 8-9.
46. There is no explicit power of eminent domain given to municipalities in the New
Mexico Constitution. The New Mexico legislature provided municipalities with the power of
eminent domain in various statutes. Explicitly with regard to water and sewage facilities:
[A] municipality may within and without the municipality... acquire,
maintain, contract for or condemn for use as a municipal utility privately
owned sewer facilities used or to be used for the collection, treatment and
disposal of sewage of the municipality or its inhabitants.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-26-1(A)(3) (Michie RepL Pampl. 1995).
Municipalities, within and without the municipal boundary, may...
acquire, maintain, contract for or condemn for use as a municipal utility
privately owned water facilities used or to be used for the furnishing and
supply of water to the municipality or its inhabitants....
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-27-2(A)(2) (Michie Repl. Pampl. 1995).
47. See City's Petition, supra note 31, at 8-9.
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First, the Commission decided that it had to determine whether its
approval was required in order for Rio Rancho to use municipal bonds to
acquire RRUC's Systems.' According to section 3-23-3 of the New Mexico
statutes, Rio Rancho could not issue bonds to purchase RRUC's Systems
without PUC approval4 9 Second, PUC determined that RRUC must seek
its approval for the "proposed sales' and abandonment s of RRUC's water
and sewer facilities." According to PUC, the transfer of the Systems from
RRUC constituted either an abandonment or sale of the Systems, thereby
requiring PUC approval.
The Commission's first reason for denying the City's motion to
dismiss soon became irrelevant. Rio Rancho had lobbied the New Mexico
state legislature to amend section 3-23-3.'2 On April 4,1995, New Mexico
Governor Gary Johnson signed into law Senate Bill 982; an emergency
clause of the law amended section 3-23-3 by specifically exempting from its
coverage any municipality attempting to condemn a water and sewage
utility and having a population over 25,000 according to the 1990 federal
decennial census.0

48. On December 14, 1994, Rio Rancho's Governing Body authorized the issuance of
bonds not to exceed $80 million to be used for acquiring RRUC's systems. See City's Petition,
supra note 31, at 6.
49. At that time, N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 3-23-3 (Michie RepL. PampL 1995) read as follows:
A. If the acquisition of a utility is to be financed from funds received from
the issuance and sale of revenue bonds, the price of the acquisition of the
utility shall be approved by the New Mexico public utility commission and
the commission shall require: (1)a determination by appraisal or otherwise
of the true value of the utility to be purchased; or (2) an engineer's estimate
of the cost of the utility to be constructed.
. No revenue bonds shall be issued for the acquisition of such a utility until
the New Mexico public utility commission has approved the issue and its
amount, date of issuance, maturity, rate of interest and general provisions.
50. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-6-12(A)(4) (Michie Repl. Pampl. 1993):
A. With the prior express authorization of the commission but not otherwise...
(4) any public utility may sell, lease, rent, purchase or acquire any public
utility plant or property constituting an operating unit or system or any
substantial part thereof, provided, however, that this paragraph shall not be
construed to require authorization for transactions in the ordinary course of
business.
51. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-9-5 (Michie Repl. Pampl. 1993).
52. Interview with Lee Huffman, Comm'n Counsel, New Mexico Pub. Util. Comm'n, in
Santa Fe, N.M. (Oct. 24,1996).
53. N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 3-23-3(C) (Michie Repl.Pampl. 1995):
The provisions of Subsections A and B of this section shall not apply to the
condemnation by a municipality having a population of twenty-five
thousand or more persons according to the 1990 federal decennial census of
either sewer facilities as authorized by Chapter 3, Article 26 NMSA 1978 or
water facilities as authorized by Chapter 3, Article 27 NMSA 1978.
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Rancho filed a special appearance and refused to submit the requested
testimony.6s
Two days after the City entered its second special appearance, it
filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus with the New Mexico Supreme
Court' which the court denied without prejudice as premature, "holding
that Rio Rancho could renew its petition after the PUC's hearing."67 The
hearing examiner again issued an order requesting the City to submit
testimony.' The city complied two days later." The hearing examiner
conducted a two-day hearing, and on October 23, 1995, issued a recommended decision.' Based on the agreed upon price, the hearing examiner
recommended
that the PUC not grant the abandonment or sale of the
7
Systems.
With an unfavorable recommended decision on its way to the
Commission, denying abandonment and sale approval for RRUC's
facilities,' RRUC filed a motion with the New Mexico Supreme Court 3
seeking a stay of the expiration of the Stipulation and a writ of mandamus
requiring the PUC to find that it had no jurisdiction over the condemnation. The court granted RRUC's motion and consolidated it with the City's
earlier petition.74 On November 7, 1995, the Commission issued its final
order in the proceeding, denying abandonment and sale approval for
RRUC. On November 8,1995, the court's stay of the Stipulation ran out and
with it the just compensation price agreed upon by RRUC and the City.

65. See id. It has been suggested that one of Rio Rancho's possible motivations for not
entering the required testimony may have been the realization that the stipulated price was
too high and it could have acquired the utility for substantially less. RRUC implicitly made
such a claim:
[Tihe lack of a timely NMPUC decision was caused in major part by the
City's refusal to comply with NMPUC's scheduling orders requiring the City
to submit testimony before the NMPUC....To now permit the City to benefit
from the jurisdictional uncertainty over the condemnation would be unjust
and inequitable.
United Water N.M., Inc.'s Verified Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Request for Stay and
Equitable Relief at 3, United Water N.M, Inc. v. New Mexico Pub. Util. Comm'n, 910 P.2d 906
(N.M. 1996) (Nos. 23151, 23264).
66. See United Water, 910 P.2d at 908.
67. Id.
68. See Final Order, supra note 36, at 3, Record at 1063, United Water, 910 P.2d 906.
69. See id.
70. Recommended Decision of Hearing Examiner at 5, Exhibit 1 to the Final Order, supra
note 36, Record at 1079,1083, United Water 910 P.2d 906.
71. See id. at 1114.
72. See id.
73. See United Water N.M., Inc. v. New Mexico Pub. Util. Comm'n, 910 P.2d 906,908
(N.M. 1996).
74. See id.
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Based on the amendment of section 3-23-3 and the Stipulation it
entered into with the City regarding the amount of just compensation,
RRUC filed a motion to withdraw its earlier petition for declaratory order
with the PUC.5 RRUC concluded that any uncertainties regarding the
necessity to obtain PUC approvals had been resolved by the amendment,
the district court's decision, and the Stipulation with the City.s The'
Commission granted the motion to withdraw as it pertained to section 323-3.56

However, the Commission maintained that RRUC must still file
applications for approval of its sale and abandonment of the Systems.' On
May 10, 1995, RRUC and the City signed an amended Stipulation that
permitted RRUC to file for approval of abandonment in compliance with
the Commission's order.' On the same date, RRUC filed a motion with the
Commission seeking approval for the abandonment of its facilities." In
accordance with the approval and New Mexico statute, the PUC issued an
order reconstituting the proceedings related to the condemnation of
RRUC's facilities and appointed a hearing examinerto preside over the
matter.' The Commission ordered the hearing examiner to determine
whether to approve the abandonment and sale of the water and
wastewater facilities. PUC reserved final judgment on the issue of whether
the Commission had jurisdiction until such time as an adequate record of
all material issues was developed.61
Upon a finding that the city of Rio Rancho was a necessary party
to its proceeding, the hearing examiner issued an order requiring the City
to file testimony by July 24,1995. However, in a special appearance fied
by Rio Rancho, the City objected to the Commission's jurisdiction in the
matter and did not file testimony.' Subsequently, the hearing examiner
again issued an order "denying" the City's objection to jurisdiction and
requiring the City to submit testimony by August 28, 1995." Again, Rio

54. See City's Petition, supra note 31, at 12.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 13.
59. See id.
60. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-10-7 (Michie RepL. PampL. 1993).
61. See Recommended Decision of Hearing Examiner at 2, Exhibit 1 to the Final Order,
supra note 36, Record 1061 at 1080, United Water N.M., Inc. v. New Mexico Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 910 P.2d 906 (N.M. 1996).
62. See Final Order, supra note 36, at 2, Record at 1062, United Water, 910 P.2d at 906.
63. See id.
64. See id.
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The court held that such an arrangement would give the Commission veto power over the district court's determination of just compensation and would be "inconsistent with the traditional approach to eminent
domain."' According to the court's analysis, the condemnation process
essentially consists of two parts. First, the court must determine if the
municipality has the authority to take certain property by condemnation."
If the court finds that the municipality is entitled to condemn the property,
the owner then has a constitutional right to just compensation for that
property.9" It is the function of the court to determine what amount of
compensation is just.' To allow the Commission to limit that compensation
or to retain final approval authority over the amount of compensation
would prohibit the municipality from exercising its right to condemn or
prohibit the utility from receiving just compensation. Moreover, the court
pointed out that the factors the Commission considers when evaluating
whether the purchase price for a public utility is in the public interest, i.e.
rate-based factors, are unrelated to the standards the court uses to
determine what constitutes just compensation To allow the Commission
to veto the district court's determination would frustrate the judicial
process of determining just compensation.
D. The Aftermath
Because the stay issued by the supreme court expired on November 8, 1995, and was not renewed by the court, RRUC and Rio Rancho
renegotiated the purchase price for the utility's systems after the court
issued its decision. The final purchase price was $5 million less than the
originally negotiated price. While the residents of Rio Rancho complained
about the Commission's interference with their attempts to acquire the
local water and sewage utility," they actually benefited in the end from the
Commission's activities. As suggested by RRUC in one of its briefs to the
court, the City, after realizing it paid too much for the utility, may have
attempted to prolong the proceedings with the Commission in an attempt
to allow the deal it had entered into with RRUC to expire." Although such

93. Id.
94. See id.
See N.AL CONST. art. 11, § 20.
96. See United Water, 910 P.2d at 913.
97. See id.
98. One state legislator, Sen. Joe Carraro, R-Albuquerque, proposed giving Rio Rancho
$351,153, Rio Rancho's cost to litigate the case. However, such a plan would in effect "punish
state agencies for good-faith efforts to apply the law." See Don't PenalizePUC, ALBUQUERQUE
95.

J., Feb. 23,1996, at A14.

99. See discussion, supra note 65.
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claims cannot be substantiated, if that was indeed the case, then Rio
Rancho may have exploited the judicial system.
PART II: ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION
Despite the political intricacies of the United Water case, the issue
to be decided by the New Mexico Supreme Court boiled down to statutory
construction. The court was forced to determine whether the legislature
intended the PUC to have authority in the condemnation of a privately
owned water and sewage utility by a municipality. Because the statute was
silent on the issue, the question was whether the broad powers conferred
upon the Commission by the PUA should be interpreted to cover condemnation proceedings. Based on legislative action directly related to municipal
condemnation of water and sewage utilities, the court most likely reached
the correct result when it ruled that the PUC did not have jurisdiction in
the matter. The decision, however, may have been incorrect in that it may
extend beyond water and sewage utilities. While there are many reasons
why the decision might not apply to electric utility condemnation, if it does
so apply it could have detrimental effects on the electric industry.
A. Voluntary Versus Involuntary
In United Water the court's decision focused on the distinction
between the involuntary nature of a condemnation versus the voluntary
nature of a sale or abandonment of property. If this had been a sale or an
abandonment of facilities by RRUC, then RRUC would have been a
" voluntary" participant in the transaction. In that case, PUC would have
had jurisdiction to determine whether the acquisition of the facilities by Rio
Rancho was in the "public interest." However, merely because the
negotiations between Rio Rancho and RRUC failed to produce an agreed
upon sale price, PUC had no jurisdiction over the matter. The distinction
seems to be a purely academic one that does not consider the true nature
of utility regulation. It does not consider the intricate nature of the
operations of many of these facilities, nor does it take into account the
environmental aspects directly related to all utilities.
1. The CaliforniaCase
The United Water decision is not without precedent, however. The
court cited two cases to support its holding that the language of section 626-12(A)(4) of the New Mexico statutes, which requires PUC approval when
a utility sells any of its facilities, refers only to voluntary transfers."° In the

100.

See United Water, 910 P.2d at 910.
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Briefs were supplied to the supreme court and oral arguments were heard
late in the year."
C. The Court's Decision
On January 27,1996, the court issued its decision holding that the
PUC did not have jurisdiction over Rio Rancho's condemnation of RRUC's
water and wastewater facilities.7' While acknowledging that the PUA
confers broad powers on the Commission to regulate public utilities, it
noted that municipal utilities are exempt from Commission controlF unless
they vote to be regulated by it.' Although the PUC acknowledged that it
would have no jurisdiction over the Systems once RRUC transferred them
to Rio Rancho, it argued that it continued to have control over RRUC and
the Systems until the condemnation was complete. Therefore, according to
its own interpretation, the PUC had jurisdiction over the proceeding and
a statutory obligation to determine whether the transfer of the facilities
would be in the "public interest" under section 62-6-12(A)(4) (sale) and
section 62-9-5 (abandonment)." The court disagreed. It looked at the plain
language of the PUA and determined that, because there is no explicit
reference to the PUC's jurisdiction over condemnation, the PUC did not
have jurisdiction in the matter.8
In addition, the court addressed the issue of whether the statutory
language implied that condemnation fell within the purview of the
Commission's power under the PUA by virtue of the "abandonment" or
"sale" clauses. Its decision hinged on the distinction between the "voluntary" nature of an abandonment or sale as opposed to the "involuntary" or
compulsory nature of a condemnation.81 While a utility decides when it is
necessary or desirable to abandon or sell part or all of its facilities, "the
utility has absolutely no say over a municipality's decision to pursue a
condemnation action against it."8 The Commission's argument that a
condemnation is similar to a "forced sale" in which the "state stands

75. See id. Oral arguments were held on Dec. 13,1995.
76. See id.
77. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-3-3(E) (Michie Repl. Pampl. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1997)
(municipalities are expressly excluded from the Public Utilities Act unless they elect to be

regulated by it).
78. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-6-5 (Michie Repl. Pampl. 1993) (municipalities may elect to
submit themselves to NMPUC regulation). See also United Water, 910 P.2d at 909.
79. See United Water, 910 P.2d at 909.
80. See id. at 910.
81. See id.
82. Id.
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toward the owner as buyer toward seller,"8 was rejected by the court
because the past cases which had so analogized condemnation proceedings
had done so to highlight the property owner's right to the market value of
the property." With regard to "abandonment," the court concluded that the
facts of the case identified this as an involuntary action, noting that RRUC
had vigorously
contested the condemnation during the hearing before the
8'
district court.
The court also looked at the legislative intent of the drafters of the
PUA in concluding that the Commission's jurisdiction did not extend to
municipal condemnation of public utilities. The PUC was originally
designed to promote the development of utilities and utility service for the
benefit of New Mexico so that its citizens may receive adequate services at
reasonable rates." Municipalities were explicitly exempt from such
regulation" because the drafters believed that "municipalities were fully
capable of protecting the interests of citizens served by a municipal utility
both inside and outside the municipalities' borders without need for PUC
oversight."' The legislature reasoned that the power of the vote would
give citizens the power to check the rates that the municipal utility
implemented.
The second argument addressed by the court was whether the
Commission had concurrent jurisdiction with the district court over a
condemnation proceeding.8 The Commission argued that "the legislative
grant of condemnation authority to municipalities can and should be
harmonized with the grant of PUC authority over a sale or abandonment"
by finding that the Commission and the district court have concurrent
jurisdiction over the condemnation.' According to the plan presented by
the PUC, the district court would determine if the municipality has the
right to condemn, and determine the amount of just compensation to the
public utility. 1 The Commission would then have authority to determine
if the amount of compensation, as determined by the district court, was in
the public interest and approve or deny the condemnation based on its
determination.' Such a process would protect the public welfare while
harmonizing the jurisdiction of the Commission and the district court.

83. Id. (quoting Jackson v. State, 106 N.E. 758,758 (N.Y. 1914)).
84. See id.
85. See id. at 911.
86. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-3-1(B) (Michie Repl. Pampl. 1993).
87. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-3-3(E) (Michie RepL Pampl. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1997).
88.
89.

United Water, 910 P.2d at 912.
See id. at 913.

90. Id.
91. See id.
92. See id.

Fall 1998]

UNITED WATER NEW MEXICO, INC.

first case, Public UtilitiesCommission v. City of Fresno,"°' California's Court
of Appeals addressed a statute that was substantially similar to the one
addressed by the New Mexico Supreme Court in United Water. In 1967,
section 851 of the California Public Utilities Code required approval from
the California Public Utilities Commission (California PUC or California
Commission) for sales of privately owned utility property dedicated to
public use. "2However, while the "primary function of the [California]
commission is to... exercise control over private companies engaged in
public service,"" the statutes empowering the California PUC, by their
silence on the matter, conferred upon the commission no jurisdiction to
regulate municipalities.10 ' Moreover, sections 1240 and 1241 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure"m expressly provided that a city could
condemn a privately owned public utility. The statutes were silent,
however, on the issue of whether commission approval was necessary for
such a condemnation.
The facts in City of Fresno dearly indicate that the city of Fresno
(Fresno) used its power of eminent domain simply to avoid having to
obtain the California PUC's approval for the sale of water utilities to
Fresno. In 1965 the Bowen Land Company, which then provided water to
Fresno, agreed to sell its entire water system and related facilities to the
City for $25,000. In accordance with the California Public Utilities Code
section 851, 0' the parties filed a joint application for approval of the
purchase with the California PUC. When the California Commission
refused to approve the sale unless certain conditions precedent were met,
the city of Fresno instituted a condemnation action with the Superior
Court. In its complaint for condemnation, Fresno alleged that the fair
market value of the water system was $25,000. Bowen's answer admitted
that the fair market value was as alleged in the complaint.
Despite Fresno's blatant attempt to avoid the required California
Commission approval imposed by California statute, the court held that
section 851 of the California PUC did not regulate a city's power of eminent
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
stated:

62 Cal. Rptr. 79 (Cal.Ct. App. 1967).
See id. at 82.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 84, nn. 2 & 3.
At the time the case was decided, section 851 of the California Public Utilities Code

No public utility... shall sell, lease, assign, mortgage, or otherwise dispose
of or encumber the whole or any part of its... line, plant, system or other
property necessary or useful in the performance of its duties to the public...
having secured from the commission an order authorizing it to
without first
do so.
City offresno,62 Cal. Rptr. at 82.
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domain. It interpreted the focus of section 851 to be the regulation of the
actions of public utilities in their dealings with property designated to the
public use.1"' Such regulation did not extend to a wholly separate power of
a municipality expressly provided for by the California legislature."
According to the California appellate court, the unequivocal power of
eminent domain provided to the municipality "is an attribute of sovereignty" and should not be limited by judicial interpretation of an equivocal
statute."°
Furthermore, the California court took into account that, similar to
New Mexico law," ° under sections 1401 and 1402 of the California PUC, a
municipality could voluntarily submit the determination of just compensation to the California Commission when seeking to acquire privatelyowned public utility property through eminent domain m
.111 However, unlike
the New Mexico law which allows municipalities to subject themselves to
general PUC regulation if the voters so choose, sections 1401 and 1402 of
the California PUC expressly provided that the California Commission
could become involved in the condemnation of public utility property by
a municipality only when the condemnor invites the commission to become
involved in a condemnation, thereby severely limiting the commission's
involvement in municipal condemnation. New Mexico law, on the other
hand, is completely silent on the issue of the PUC's role in condemnation,
not limiting the PUC's involvement in condemnations of public utility

property either implicitly or explicitly.
2. The Indiana Case
The New Mexico Supreme Court also relied on Decatur County
Rural ElectricMembership Corp.v. Public Service Co. of Indiana ..to support
the holding that regulation of sales of utility assets under the PUA does not
include an involuntary condemnation of utility property. DecaturCounty
involved the condemnation of one utility's assets by another utility. Over
a ten-year period, the City of Greensburg annexed certain land to the city.
The Public Service Company of Indiana (PSCI), which provided electric
service to the City of Greensburg, sought to purchase facilities in the
annexed area which were owned by the Decatur County Rural Electric
Membership Corporation (REMC), the utility that provided electric service
to the annexed area prior to annexation. When negotiations between the

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See id. at 83.
See id. at 82, n.2.
See id. at 84.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-6-5 (Michie Rep]. Pampl. 1993).
See City of Freno, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 85.

112. 307 N.E.2d 96 (1974).
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mean that, although both types of abandonment fall within the term
"abandonment" by itself, the legislature wanted to clarify its language so
that the type of dispute that arose in the United Water case would not
present itself to the Ohio courts.
B. Legislative Intent
While these cases certainly do not prove one way or another
whether the requirement for either sale or abandonment should be applied
to condemnation, they do show that the distinction is not as clear cut as the
New Mexico Supreme Court seems to make it. The applicability of the
utility sale and abandonment statutes cannot be determined merely from
their language. Moreover, any possible distinction based on the voluntary
nature of a sale or an abandonment versus the involuntary nature of a
condemnation was not likely considered by the New Mexico Legislature
when it passed the Public Utilities Act. While the interpretation may make
legal sense, any analysis of the decision should compare the result reached
by the court with the probable intent of the legislature in passing the Act.
Although New Mexico does not maintain legislative history, the legislators'
intent on this issue can be gleaned from other actions related to the Rio
Rancho water and sewage utility condemnation. The court did not ignore
those actions and considered them in making its decision. Based on the
language and the time of the provision granting municipalities the power
to condemn water and sewage utilities and the last-minute amendment
removing the necessity for PUC approval of certain bond issues, the
legislature probably wanted municipalities to have'the power to condemn
these utilities without having to seek PUC approval.
In 1994, the same year that Rio Rancho passed a resolution to
acquire the facilities of RRUC by any legal means, the legislature amended
the sections of the New Mexico statutes related to water and sewage
facilities to allow municipalities to "acquire, maintain, contract for or
condemn" such utilities.' These amendments were most likely the result
of lobbying by Rio Rancho, which had in mind taking control of its water
and sewage facilities. The language of the amendments, sections 3-261(A)(3) and 3-27-2(A)(2), clearly circumscribes the scope of its reach. The
power to condemn private utilities is limited to water and sewage facilities,
although the power is extended to facilities both within and without the

124. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-26-1(A)(3) (Michie Repl. Pampl. 1995) (a municipality may
condemn sewer facilities) and § 3-27-2(A)(2) (Michie Repl. Pampl. 1995) (a municipality may
condemn water facilities) were both passed in the beginning of 1994. Later that year, Rio
Rancho began proceedings to acquire RRUC's water and sewer facilities.
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municipality boundary. There is, therefore, no ambiguity as to a municipality's power to condemn these types of facilities.
In addition, the legislature explicitly removed one of the grounds
on which the PUC had asserted jurisdiction after the condemnation
proceedings had already begun. After the negotiations between Rio Rancho
and RRUC had failed to reach an agreement and condemnation proceedings against RRUC had been initiated, the New Mexico PUC asserted
jurisdiction over the condemnation based on three different sections of the
statutes. While the sections requiring PUC approval for the sale or
abandonment of assets may have been of questionable relevance to the
condemnation action, section 3-23-3 of the statutes gave the PUC explicit
jurisdiction to approve or disapprove the use of revenue bonds to fund the
purchase of a utility. Months after the condemnation proceedings had
begun, however, the legislature explicitly removed that requirement from
the Rio Rancho water and sewage condemnation case. The amendment
applied only to the condemnation of water and sewage utilities by
municipalities, and only to municipalities with a population of more than
25,000 according to the 1990 federal decennial census." Because those
requirements could apply to only one city other than Rio Rancho, 2 ' the
legislature apparently intended to exclude from PUC jurisdiction the
condemnation process taking place in Rio Rancho.
C. Public Interest
Although the United Water judgment most likely followed the
intent of the New Mexico legislature, the net effect of the case is to remove
the "public interest" consideration from the analysis. Both the sale and
abandonment statutes for utilities require that the PUC take into consideration the "public interest" when deciding whether or not to approve the
transfer of a utility's property.' The factors considered by a district court,

125.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-23-3(C) (Michie Repl.Pampl. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1997).

126.

Interview with Lee Huffman, supra note 18.

127. Section 62-9-5 of the New Mexico statutes provides:
No utility shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to the
jurisdiction of the commission, or any service rendered by means of such
facilities, without first obtaining the permission and approval of the
commission. The commission shall grant such permission and approval,

after notice and hearing, upon finding that the continuation of service is

unwarranted or that the presnmt and future public convenience and nnesity do
not otherwise require the continuation of the service or use of the facility....
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-9-5 (Michie RepL PampL 1993) (emphasis added).
For sales or other transfers under section 62-6-12 (sale), the Commission is required to;
approve the transfer unless the transaction is found to be "unlawful" or "inconsistent with
the public interest." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-6-13 (Michie RepL Pampl. 1993) (emphasis added).
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utilities failed to reach a sale price, PSCI initiated a condemnation action
against REMC to acquire the facilities located in the annexed territory. PSCI
relied on section 8-1-13-19 (section 18a) of the Indiana Code as the basis for
initiating the condemnation.113 The statute specifically provided that a
utility (Utility A) may condemn the property of another utility (Utility B)
when the municipality served by Utility A annexes land served by Utility
B. In opposition to the condemnation by PSCI, REMC argued that the
condemnation, although explicitly permitted by the statute, must be
approved by the Indiana Public Service Commission (Indiana Commission
or PSC) according to section 8-1-2-84 (section 84) of the Indiana Code.""
The Court rejected the application of section 84 to condemnation actions
under section 18a for two reasons. First, the court noted that section 84
made "no mention of condemnation actions, but rather, deals only with
voluntary sale or leases.". Second, the court noted that section 18a made
no reference to the requirements of section 84, and therefore, held that they
should not be imported to section 18a absent explicit language that they
should apply.
While the language of section 84 of the Indiana Code is similar to
section 62-6-12(A)(4) of the New Mexico statutes governing the sale of

113. At the time the case was decided, the Indiana Code section 8-1-13-19 provided:
Whenever a municipality in which a public utility... is rendering electric
utility service under a franchise, license or indeterminate permit... ("fran.
chised utility")... annexes additional territory and such annexed territory
includes any territory in which the franchised utility was not authorized to
render electric utility service immediately prior to such annexation but in
which some other public utility.., or municipal owned utility... was
lawfully rendering electric utility service at such time, then the franchised
utility and the other utility shall promptly negotiate for the purchase by the
franchised utility and the other utility shall promptly negotiate for the
purchase by the franchised utility of the property owned by the other utility
within the annexed territory ....In the event that such property has not
been purchased by the franchised utility within 90 days after such
annexation takes place, then the franchised utility may bring an action...
for the condemnation of such property of the other utility.
DecaturCounty, 307 N.E.2d at 99.
114. Section 8-1-2-84 of the Indiana Code is similar to the New Mexico statute concerning
the sale of utility property. It provides:
With the consent and approval of the commission.. but not otherwise, any
two (2) or more public utilities furnishing a like service or product and
doing business in the same municipality or locality within Indiana, or any
two (2) or more public utilities whose lines intersect or parallel each other
within Indiana, may be merged and may enter into contracts with each other
which will enable such public utilities to operate their plants or lines in
connection with each other.
IND. CODE ANN. § 8-1-2-84 (West 1991).
115. Decatur County, 307 N.E.2d at 104.
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public utility property, there are significant differences between United
Water and Decatur County. First, whereas United Water dealt with the
condemnation of an entire water and sewage utility by a municipality,
Decatur County involved the condemnation of a part of one utility's
facilities by another utility, both of whom were regulated by the Indiana
PSC. Moreover, the condemnation was the result of the city of Greensburg
extending its borders through annexation. More importantly, however, the
condemnation power delegated to the utility in DecaturCounty was very
specific in terms of the situations in which it applied, i.e., only when a
municipality has annexed territory that was previously served by a utility
other than the utility serving the municipality. The specificity of the
Indiana statute indicates that if the Indiana legislature had intended for the
requirements of section 84 to apply, it would have done so expressly.
The power of eminent domain conferred upon municipalities by
sections 3-26-1(A)(3) and 3-27-2(A)(2) of the New Mexico statutes, while
specific in terms of what types of property may be acquired through
eminent domain, is more general in terms of the instances in which the
power may be exerted. Unlike the Indiana statute, no requirement as to the
type of negotiations or the time period of those negotiations is made by the
New Mexico statutes. Moreover, the New Mexico statutes combine the
terms "acquire," "maintain," and "contract for" with the term "condemn"
in their language. The Indiana statute expressly applies only to condemnations. As noted earlier, if Rio Rancho had elected to "acquire" or "contract
for" RRUC's facilities in some way other than condemnation, the PUC
would have had jurisdiction. Therefore, the legislature's failure to expressly
provide that the approval requirements of either the sale (section 62-612(A)(4)) or abandonment (section 62-9-5) of utility property apply to
condemnation of water and sewage utilities does not shed light as to
whether the legislature intended the requirements to apply as they did in
the Indiana case.
While the two cases that the New Mexico Supreme Court relied
upon have similarities to the Rio Rancho water and sewage municipal
condemnation, there are numerous other cases that analogize condemnation to an involuntary sale.""' Although these cases do not necessarily
overcome the voluntary-involuntary distinction drawn by the court in
United Water, they do indicate that there is some dispute as to whether or

116. Besides Jackson v. State, 106 N.E. 758, 758 (N.Y. 1914), relied on by NMPUC for the
proposition that a condemnation can be defined as a "forced sale," numerous cases have
analogized condemnation to an involuntary or forced sale. See, e.g., American Soc'y of
Composers, Authors and Publishers v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 912 F.2d 563 (2nd
Cir. 1990); United States v. Morton, 387 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1968); White v. State, 319 So. 2d 247
(Ala. 1975); Lange v. State of Washington, 547 P.2d 282 (Wash. 1976).
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when a condemnation falls within the meaning of the term "sale," as used
in a statute such as section 62-6-12(A)(4) of the New Mexico statutes. The
same dispute is present with the utility abandonment statute. When one
applies the voluntary-involuntary distinction to the term "abandonment,"
the exercise appears academic. Moreover, while the distinction may hold
water as a legal argument, it definitely leaks upon close scrutiny.
3. The Pennsylvania Case
To support its distinction between abandonment as voluntary on
the one hand and condemnations as involuntary on the other, the court
cited a 1954 case involving a gas utility. In Emerald Coal and Coke Co. v.
Equitable Gas Co., 1 7 a court-ordered injunction threatened to force the
defendant gas company to abandon its public utility facilities. The
defendant challenged the court's jurisdiction in the matter, arguing that
any court injunction that required it to abandon its system would have to
be approved by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Pennsylvania
PUC) according to Pennsylvania's public utility law. The court rejected the
defendant's argument stating, "[aibandonment necessarily implies the
voluntary or intentional act of the party having the facility, right or power
to relinquish it."" s
4. The Ohio Case
In a more recent case, however, the Supreme Court of Ohio
decided that the city of Clyde (Clyde) was required to get approval from
the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) before it could force the
Toledo Edison Company (Toledo) to abandon its lines through the
enforcement of a city ordinance. 9 In 1965 Clyde turned over its electric
generation, transmission, and distribution system to Toledo and provided
Toledo with a twenty-five year non-exclusive contract to provide electricity
to the residents of Clyde. Twenty-three years later, with only two years left
on the contract, the residents of Clyde decided to re-establish the municipal
utility in the city by building a duplicate electric transmission system. 20
When the franchise agreement expired in 1990, Clyde denied Toledo's
application to renew the agreement. Over the next five years, the two
utilities continued to jointly provide electric service to the inhabitants of
Clyde.
In 1995 the peaceful co-existence of the two utilities ended when
Clyde's city council passed an ordinance that required all future arrange-

117.

107 A2d 734 (Pa. 1954).

118. Id, at 737.
119. State ex rel. Toledo Edison Co. v. City of Clyde, 668 N.E.2d 498 (Ohio 1996).
120. See id.
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ments for electricity within the city be made with the municipal utility?'
While the ordinance did not require that established contracts be transferred to the municipal utility, it would eventually require all arrangements
for electricity be transferred to Clyde's utility as they came up for renewal.
Toledo argued that the ordinance would require it to abandon its electric
distribution systems. According to Ohio law, any abandonment of utility
property had to be approved by PUCO.'12 The Court held that, based on the
statutes, Clyde was required to obtain PUCO approval before it could
enforce the ordinance and that enforcement of the ordinance constituted an
abandonment even though the abandonment was not voluntary."t
One point regarding the Ohio statute needs to be emphasized and
may lend credence to the New Mexico Supreme Court's classification of
abandonment as involuntary. Section 4905.20 of the Ohio Revised Code
explicitly provides that approval must be obtained from PUCO before a
utility "shall abandon" its property or "be requiredto abandon" any of its
property (emphasis added). The language of the statute provides independently for both voluntary and involuntary abandonment, "required
abandonment" Moreover, section 4905.21 of the Revised Code specifically
requires a "political subdivision," which includes a municipality, to apply
with PUCO anytime it wishes to abandon or have abandoned any part of
an electric line. In both sections of the code, the powers and limitations of
the municipality and the PUCO are more dearly defined than in the New
Mexico statutes. The Ohio Code's explicit provision for both voluntary and

involuntary abandonment might be interpreted to mean that the term
"abandonment," by itself, refers only to voluntary actions. Otherwise the
legislature would not have needed a separate involuntary abandonment
clause in the statute. However, the language may also be interpreted to

121. Section 3 of the ordinance read:
On and after the effective date of the ordinance, all utility service

arrangements for electric water or sewer utility service within the corporate
limits of the City of Clyde, as the same may be altered from time to time
through annexation or otherwise, shall be made with the City of Clyde's
electric, water and sewage utilities.

City of Clyde, 668 N.K2d at 501.
122. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4905.2 (Anderson 1991) states:
No... public utility as defined in Section 4905.02 of the Revised Code
furnishing service or facilities in this state, shall abandon or be required to
abandon or withdraw any main ... electric light line... or any portion
thereof....
Oio Rzv. CoDE ANN. § 4905.21 (Anderson 1991) states:
Any... political subdivision desiring to abandon, dose, or have abandoned,
withdrawn, or dosed for traffic or service all or any partof any... (electric)

line... shall make application to the public utilities commission in writing.
123. City of Clyde, 668 N.E.2d at 509.
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on the other hand, do not include the "public interest." The district court
follows a two-step process:' First, the court determines if the municipality
has the right to condemn the property. This can include a requirement that
the condemned property be for a public use.' The public use requirement
is not analogous to "public interest;" rather it is a constitutional requirement that the property not be transferred to use by a private individual.'
Second, the court determines the amount of "just compensation," usually
based on the fair market value. As noted by the New Mexico Supreme
Court, such a determination does not consider rate-based factors to reach
its result. 1 Therefore, the City of Rio Rancho has no duty to consider the
"public interest" when it decides to condemn the RRUC. "Neither the
District Court nor the City are [sic) charged with addressing these [public]
interests in the course of a condemnation .... The Court's interest is in
assuring the due process rights of the condemnee. The City's interest is
purely local."132
Since a municipality is not required to consider the public interest
when deciding to condemn a utility, and because the municipal government is beholden only to the residents of the municipality, the only aspect
of the public interest with which the municipality is likely to concern itself
is the interest of the local community. In the case of Rio Rancho, however,
even the interests of the city may have been compromised by local politics.
In conducting its review of the stipulated agreement between Rio Rancho
and RRUC, the PUC found that the agreed upon "just compensation" price
was unusually high.' Furthermore, the revenue bond structure created by
the stipulated agreement was back-loaded, providing comparable rates to
the city during the first ten to fourteen years of payments, but increasing
dramatically thereafter.M Despite the fact that both the decision to
condemn the Systems and the revenue bond structure were approved by
the residents of Rio Rancho through local elections, it is highly unlikely that

128. See United Water, 910 P.2d at 913.
129. In the case of California, the Code of Civil Procedure § 1241 required that if property
is already devoted to a public use it must appear that the public use to which it is to be
applied is a "more necessary public use." Under the same section of the Code, the California
Legislature stated that when public utility property already devoted to the public use is to be
condemned by a city, the city use is deemed "the more necessary public use" as a matter of
law.
130. The requirement that the condemned property be put to a "public use" has been
relaxed in recent years. See Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
131. United Water, 910 P.2d at 913.
132. Final Order, supra note 36, at 7.
133. "Although RRUC is now receiving $72.5 million for the plant, it paid only $44 million
for the water and sewage utility... when (it] bought it in 1991." Id. at 10.
134. "Thus, theses [sic) benefits slowly accrete over time because any benefits from them
are effectively 'backloaded.' " Id. at 12.
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the voters understood that the bond structure would cause their water rates
to increase over time. Furthermore, by the time the bond issue went to the
polls, RRUC no longer had any incentive to contest the City's condemnation of its Systems.3 s
The PUC's primary reason for denying the transfer of the Systems
to the City was the proposed rate structure. Through its hearings and
analysis, the hearing examiner for the Commission found that the rate
structure would cause an increase in the rates to the Rio Rancho customers,
both within and without the city limits. Despite the tax benefits, the lower
financing rates, and the book depreciation of the Systems under control of
the municipality, the residents will have to pay an increased $61.5 million
in costs over what would be paid under RRUC's control.36 The Commission, therefore, found that, based on the rate structure required to meet the
bond payments, the "abandonment" by RRUC was not in the "public
interest."
The term "public interest" can take on a seemingly endless number
of definitions and an endless number of factors can possibly be used to
determine whether a certain action is in the "public interest." Fortunately,
the Commission has somewhat limited the definition. For a sale, in order
for the Commission to deny approval of the sale, it must find that there
was a net detriment to the public interest.' 7 With regard to the abandonment of public utility property, the standard is somewhat higher. In order
for the Commission to approve an abandonment of public utility property,
it must find that there will be a net benefit to the public.38 In making its
determination, the Commission looks at four factors: (1) the extent of the
carrier's loss on the particular branch or portion of the service, and the
relation of that loss to the carrier's operation as a whole; (2) the use of the

135. By the time the Rio Rancho municipal government had sent the bond issue to the
polls, RRUC had already lost possession of its Systems by virtue of the district court's ruling
that Rio Rancho had the right to immediate possession of those Systems. The high price
contemplated by the agreement also discouraged RRUC from contesting the transfer. As such,
RRUC had no incentive to raise a campaign against the transfer.
136. See Final Order, supra note 36, at 11.
137. The Commission in In re Southern Union Gas Co., 64 PUR 4th 17,24 (NMPUC Case
Nos. 1891, 1892 (1984)) defined the standard as:
The "not inconsistent with the public interest" standard is applicable to
commission approvals of transfers of utility property and issuance of
securities by utilities. This standard requires that we [the Commission] find
that there is likely to be a net detriment to the public interest before we may
withhold our approval of proposed transfers of utility property or issuance
of securities by utilities under our jurisdiction. If the sale of the assets or
issuance of securities is merely neutral, or equally balanced as to benefit and
detriment to the public interest, we are compelled to approve such requests.
138. See Final Order, supranote 36, at 10.
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service by the public and the prospects as to future use; (3) a balancing of
the carrier's loss with the inconvenience and hardship to the public upon
discontinuance of such service; and (4) the availability and the adequacy
of service to be substituted.' While these standards only slightly limit the
term "public interest," they do provide the Commission some direction
regarding the analysis to be done.
Although the potential rate and hook-up cost increases were the
primary reason for the PUC's denial of the transfer of the System, there
may be other "public interest" reasons besides the Commission Committee
standards for PUC review of the transfer. In an arid climate like New
Mexico, control of water resources in a central body may make better use
of the scarce resource. An agency such as the PUC could regulate where
water goes depending on where it is most needed, considering environmental and social consequences in addition to the standard economic
factors. Such a system could balance the inequities in water rates presently
experienced in various regions of the state.140 Moreover, control of the
water rates could be the most efficient way to promote water conservation,
an important issue in New Mexico. 1 People tend to respond well to effects
on their pocketbooks.
However, as has been demonstrated by a vast majority of regulated
industries, increased regulation often causes more problems than it
resolves.1" Government is notoriously inefficient in controlling and
regulating industry. Moreover, despite any possible benefits of PUC
control over all the various utilities across the state, the New Mexico
legislature dearly did not intend that the PUC's power extend that far. The

139. The New Mexico Commission adopted these factors in In re PublicSeru. Co. of N.M.,
119 PUR 4th 48 (NMPUC Case No. 2296 (1990) affid, PublicSero. Co. of N.M. v. New Mexico Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 815 P.2d 1169 (N.M. 1991). The test was originally articulated in Commuters'
Comm. v. PennsylvaniaPub. Util. Comm'n, 88 A.2d 420,424 (Pa. Super. 1952). The factors have
come to be known as the "Commission Committee" standards.
140. Albuquerque water rates are significantly lower than rates in other parts of the state.
See Water Is Liquid Gold; Rate Hike Reflects This, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Apr. 23,1998, at C2.
141. Albuquerque has instituted numerous other plans aimed at reducing water use in the
area. included among them are refunds for low-flow toilets and xeric landscaping as well as
higher rates for increased summer water consumption. See Cindy Glover & Michael Hartranft,
Water HabitsChanging, Poll Shows, ALBUQUERQUE J., May 31,1996, at Al.
142. During the past 25 years, the airline, telephone, trucking, and natural gas industries
have all undergone tremendous deregulation. The electric industry is presently marked for
deregulation on the federal level and has already undergone deregulation on the state level
in many areas. The deregulation movement was sparked by the cost, inefficiency and
ineffectiveness of regulation when compared with a free market system. See Michael T.
Maloney, et al., On StrandedCost Recovery in the Deregulationof the U.S. Electric Power Industry,
37 NAT. REsouRcEs J.59 (1997).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

powers delegated to the Commission, although broad, are limited to certain
areas of regulation.
The commission shall have general and exclusive power and
jurisdiction to regulate and supervise every public utility in
respect to its rates and service regulationsand in respect to its
securities, all in accordance with the provisions and subject to
the reservations of the [PUA], and to do all things necessary
and convenient in the exercise of its power and jurisdiction.'
While the PUC has power over rates, the legislature never contemplated
that the PUC would control all water allocation or sewage disposal.
Moreover, there are benefits to be derived from giving municipalities control over their water supplies. In the Southwest, such power
translates into control over the development within the municipality. All
development is dependent upon what water sources are available and how
much water is available. When municipalities have the ability to control
water allocation, they also have some control over the type and rate of
development. In the recent case, of the Santa Fe water utility
municipalization, the PUC praised local control over water systems:
For a community in the arid West, such as Santa Fe, a good
water system furnishes a necessity of life that, metaphorically
and otherwise, forms the lifeblood of the community's
existence. Where, as here, a community seeks to own the
water system that has served it for over 100 years, the
gaining of that system is a milestone in the life of that
community if only because the City will, for the first time,
have sole responsibility for its water needs both now and in
the future.'"
Furthermore, any detrimental effects of the municipal acquisition and
control of the water system are likely to be borne primarily by the
municipality itself. The PUC, in approving Santa Fe's acquisition of its
water system from the Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM),
stated that while the city of Santa Fe was gaining control over its water, it
also took with that the added risk of higher rates and losses to service
quality." s The size and extent of most water systems dictate that risks of
increased rates and decreased service quality will be borne by the
municipality and, in some circumstances, the neighboring communities
dependent on the municipal water system. The effects will almost never
143. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-64 (Michie Repl. Pampl. 1993 & Cur. Supp. 1997) (emphasis
added).
144. In re City of Santa Fe, N.M., New Mexico Pub. Util. Comm'n, Case No. 2588 at 4 (May
22, 1995), availableat 1995 WL 389322.

145. See id.
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extend much beyond the city limits because water systems are by nature
small and localized.
Part III: THE EFFECT OF THE UNITED WATER DECISION ON
ELECTRIC UTILITIES
The same cannot be said for electric utilities. Electric utility systems
are typically larger and considerably more interconnected with state and
national systems.' Due to the nature of the "product," electricity cannot
be stored or inventoried;147 unlike most other commodities, it must be
produced at the same time customers demand it.' Moreover, the cost of
transporting electricity over long distances can be cost prohibitive except
to balance out demand fluctuations during peak demand periods."
Therefore, large utilities often design large power generating plants in their
service territories in order to provide power to customers.1wLikewise, the
numerous smaller electric utilities across the nation often build generation

plants within or near their service territories. However, combined they
generate only about 10 percent of the total power produced in this

country. ' More often than not, the smaller electric utilities buy power at

wholesale from the larger utilities or other power producers. 2 Even those
that do generate their own power often rely on larger generators to provide
additional power during peak demand hours. The design and construction
of generating plants is based on the total demand in the service area.
All the residents and businesses must be directly connected to the
power generators by a system of wires in order to deliver power to those
customers." Water utilities are similar in that all the customers must be
connected to a water supply in order to receive water. With electricity,
however, the interconnectedness of the utility is much more extensive.
High voltage wires connect the generating plants to one another and to
distribution centers that deliver the power to final customers. The
interconnected nature of electric utilities distinguishes it from water
utilities and also creates a certain interdependent nature for the communities served by a utility company. Changes in one part of the utility's system

146. Interview with Professor Suedeen Kelly, Univ. of N.M. School of Law, in
Albuquerque, N.M. (Apr. 22,1998).
147. See El Paso Electric Company's Report of Experts, § 1, at 3, City of Las Cruces v. El
Paso Elec. Co., 904 F. Supp. 1238 (D.N.M. 1995) [hereinafter Report of Experts).

148. See id. §1, at 3.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See id.
See id. §1, at 2.
See Doane &Macavoy, supra note 15, at 12.
See Report of Experts, supranote 147, § 1 at 2.
See id.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

can have both physical and economic effects on the entire system.
Therefore, one municipality leaving the system can adversely affect the
remaining customers.
These differences in the nature of water and electric utilities could
make United Water a bad precedent for the electric industry in New Mexico.
Although the decision most likely reached the correct result for water and
sewage utilities based on both the legislative intent on the issue and the
nature of those utilities, if the decision is extended to electric utilities the
PUC will not have the power to oversee the condemnation of electric
utilities. Since neither the courts nor the condemning municipalities have
an obligation to consider the "public interest" issues outside the locality, it
is unlikely that anyone will take into account, and either balance or
remedy, the potential detrimental effects such a condemnation could have
on the remaining customers.
A. Will the United Water Decision Apply to Electric Utilities?
There are numerous reasons why the United Water decision might
never be applied to an electric utility condemnation by a municipality.
First, New Mexico courts may interpret the United Water case to apply only
to water and sewage utilities even though there is nothing in the case that
expressly limits the decision to those types of utilities."' In United Water,
the court considered numerous factors that do not apply equally to water
and electric utilities. Moreover, some of the legislation relied on by the
court applied only to water utilities.I" However, the actual holding of the
case is an interpretation of the PUA which governs both electric and water
and sewage utilities.1" The voluntary-involuntary distinction created and
relied upon by the court to distinguish condemnations from sales and
abandonments applies equally to electric and water utilities.
Second, the legislature may amend the PUA to expressly provide
for PUC jurisdiction in electric utility condemnation actions by a municipality. Such an express statement by the legislature would likely be the best
way to ensure that the "public interest" is considered in a transfer of
electric facilities, thereby ensuring that other customers served by the
utility are not injured by the condemnation. The legislature could also

154.

Although the conclusion of the case in the last paragraph states "that Section 62-6-

12(A)(4) (sale) and Section 62-9-5 (abandonment) do not give the PUC jurisdiction over
municipal condemnations of regulated water and sewage utilities," United Water, 910 P.2d at
914, the reasoning of the case, which is based on the voluntary/involuntary distinction, is
certainly not limited to water and sewage utilities.
155. See NM. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-23-3, 3-26-1(A)(3), 3-27-2(A)(2) (Michie Repl. Pampl. 1995).
156. See N.ML STAT. ANN. § 62-3-3 (Michie RepL Pampl. 1993). The PUA also governs other
forms of public utilities such as natural gas. See id.
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direct the PUC to consider only certain factors in making its determination
or otherwise limit the PUC's role in such a condemnation. Considering the
legislature's recent interest in the electric industry,"' this may be the best
way to limit the court's holding in United Water.
Finally, the express provision of the New Mexico statutes that
provided municipalities with the power to condemn water and sewage
utilities, by implication, might have limited the condemnation power to
cover only those types of utilities. In other words, because the New Mexico
legislature expressly conferred upon municipalities the power to condemn
water and sewage utilities, it would have to do the same for electric utilities
before municipalities would have the power to condemn them. United
States District Court Judge Leslie Smith certified the question of whether
municipalities have the power to condemn electric systems within their
limits to the New Mexico Supreme Court.s However, the New Mexico
legislature recently made the issue moot.1s9 On April 11, 1997, New Mexico
Governor Gary Johnson signed a bill that would permit a city to condemn
an electric utility."W The bill is limited in its reach, however. The language
is designed so that the law only applies to the Las Cruces condemnation of
El Paso Electric Company's (EPE) systems that lie within the municipal
limits, lending further support for the argument that municipalities need
express authorization from the legislature to have the power to condemn
6
the utilities which serve them. "
B. The Las Cruces Municipalization Plan
Until recently, the question as to whether the United Water decision
would apply equally to water and electric utilities would probably not have
drawn much consideration from the legislature or the electric industry. As
noted earlier, Rio Rancho's acquisition of RRUC was the first time in New
Mexico that a municipality had condemned a privately owned public
utility. However, during the past decade the electric industry has experi-

157. The New Mexico legislature has had the issue of electric competition before it every
year since 1993. Interview with Professor Suedeen Kelly, supra note 146.
158. See City of Las Cruces v. El Paso Electric Co., 904 F. Supp. 1238 (D.N.M. 1995).
159.

See City of Las Cruces v. El Paso Electric Co., 954 P.2d 72,74 (N.M. 1998).

160. See Michael G. Murphy, Las Cruces Utility Takeover Approved, ALBUQUERQUE J., Apr.
12,1997, at C4.
161. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-24-1 (Michie Cumulative Supp. 1997) and 42A-3-1 (Michie
Cum. Supp. 1998). Because the legislation can only apply to Las Cruces, the El Paso Electric
Co. has filed suit alleging that the statute is unconstitutional because it amounts to "special

legislation." See Suit Seeks Halt of Condemnation Try, ALBUQUERQUE J., May 16,1998, at B3 and
N.M. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4.
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enced a surge of municipalization activity."6 The increased activity is due

in large part to recent changes in the body of law governing the regulation
of electric utilities.1" In 1992, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of
1992 (EPAct), making it possible for municipal utilities to acquire less
expensive, wholesale electric power." In an attempt to take advantage of
the low-cost power alternatives, 39 cities and towns across the United
16
States have at least considered municipalizing their electric service.
Although there are ways to municipalize other than through the use of
eminent domain,1 " at least one of those 39 cities has considered condemnation as an option.1 67
In New Mexico alone, both Albuquerque and Las Cruces have
explored the option of municipalizing their electric service. Although
Albuquerque has put discussion of the issue on hold, Las Cruces has made
significant steps toward establishing a working municipal electric system.
Las Cruces began contemplating municipalization of its electric service as
early as 1987.'" At that time, the EPE, 6 the investor owned utility (IOU)
that provides Las Cruces with power, was having serious financial

difficulties that resulted in higher rates to its customers.
EPE's financial difficulties began in the late 1970s and 1980s. From
World War II until the middle of the 1960s, the electric industry experienced large and consistent growth in demand.'" Based on that trend, EPE
invested in the Palo Verde Nuclear Project in the 1970s as a means of
keeping up with increasing demand." EPE also diversified its investments

162. See Doane & Spulber, supra note 4, at 335.
163. See Kelly, supra note 2, at 47.
164. See § 211 of the Federal Power Act, as amended by § 721 of the Energy Policy Act of
1992,16 U.S.C. § 824j (1994).

165. See Doane & Spulber, supra note 4, at 335.
166. Cities can also build duplicate distribution facilities or can purchase the existing
facilities from the investor owned utility (IOU) presently serving the area. See Doane &
Spulber, supra note 4.
167. See EEI STATUS REPORT 1997, supra note 4.
168. See EDISON ELEC. INST., STATUS REPORT ON ELEcTRIuc UTILrTY MUNICIPALIZATION AND
BYFASS ACTIrVrIS 14 (June 1996) (hereinafter EEI STATUS REPORT 1996).
169. EPE is an Investor Owned Utility that serves 258,000 customers in El Paso, Las
Cruces, and small fanning communities along the Rio Grande. See Kathryn Jones, A Big
Struggle Over a Small Fry, N.Y. TOM, Sept. 7,1993, at D1. Of those customers, approximately
65,000 are in Las Cruces. See John Robertson, Las Cruces Takeover Try Bolstered, ALBUQUERQUE
J., Mar. 20,1997, at A13.
170. During this period, demand grew steadily at 7 percent a year. See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO
&JOSEIH TOMAIN, REG. LAW AND POL'Y 275 (1993).
171. In 1976, Las Cruces objected to EPE's plan to invest in the Palo Verde project. See
Michael G. Murphy, Las Cruces Power Struggle May End, ALBUQUERQUE J., Apr. 7,1997, at Al.
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condemnation is in the public interest. Its analysis and its decision are
purely economic in nature. Las Cruces implicitly made a "public interest"
determination when it decided to acquire its electric utility system.
However, that determination was based only on the interests of the Las
Cruces community. It did not consider what impacts the condemnation
might have on other EPE customers. However, there will be impacts and
they should be addressed during the process.
Two major concerns that would not likely be considered by the
courts are engineering feasibility and economic impacts of the condemnation. The interconnectedness of electric utility systems means that changes
in one area can affect other areas. For example, if Las Cruces leaves the
system and seeks to purchase power from a more distant, lower cost power
generator, EPE would still have to "wheelr'90 that power across its
transmission lines in order for Las Cruces to receive the power. Such added
power flows could mean that other areas of the system may not receive
adequate power because the transmission lines are only capable of carrying
a certain amount of power.191 Moreover, EPE might have to increase its
existing system in order for it to meet the increased demand put on it by
Las Cruces buying power from outside EPE's system.
While these are real engineering concerns related to a condemnation, most of them have been mitigated by both legislation and technological advances. Much of the legislation related to electric utilities deals
with requirements that IOUs meet the service requirements to the
customers in their service areas before any other demands are met. In the
case of Las Cruces, EPE's system was designed and created to provide
service to Las Cruces along with the other communities. The chances that
the transmission demands on the system will change dramatically if Las

190. "Wheeling" has been defined as a process:
that breaks down the exclusive rights that power companies. have
traditionally had in geographic areas. It involves moving electricity from a
power plant owned by one company across high-voltage transmission lines
owned by another. Wholesale wheeling involves moving electricity from
one utility, or power producer, to another.
Chaney, A Powerful Change: Big Utilities Competition Could Give Consumers a Choice
ALSuQuRQuEJ., Mar. 20,1995, at Business Outlook 1.Wholesale wheeling has already been
approved by EPAct, § 721, 16 US.C. § 824j. Retail wheeling plans have been proposed in
many areas of the country but still have not been included in federal legislation. Cities like
Las Cruces hope to take advantage of wholesale wheeling through municipalization by
becoming eligible wholesalers of electricity under EPAct. See Kelly, supra note 2, at 46-51.
191. For a discussion of the technical pecularities and difficulties of transitting electricity,
see Peter C. Christensen, Overview of Electricity Generation and the Industry, in ELECTRIC
INDUSTRY: OPPOiUNImEs AND IMPACTS FOR RESoURCE PRODUCERS, POWER GENERATORS,
MARn-ETRS, AND CONSUMERS 1-1 (1996) (published by Rocky Mountain Mineral Law

Foundation).
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Cruces leaves the system are slight. Moreover, technological advances in
the monitoring and control of transmission make IOUs much more capable
of adapting their facilities to changes in the system."
A more difficult problem lies in the economic changes that will
occur as a result of a community leaving the system. The most significant
the deregulation of the electric industry is
economic issue surrounding
"stranded costs." 193 Stranded costs are a result of the nature of electricity
and regulation of the industry. IOUs design their generation facilities based
on the projected demand from the entire service area.' Because electricity
cannot be stored, the IOU must plan generation that is large enough to
meet the highest demand, the peak demand.'" The larger the demand, the
greater the cost to develop adequate generation. The costs of building
transmission, distribution and generation facilities are passed on to the
customers inthe form of rates paid for service. Once the investment in
those facilities has been made, its amount is constant except for the costs to
operate the generation plants. When customers leave the system, the IOU
must still pay for the generation investment it made based on projected
demand. The projected demand is based on all the customers, even those
that later leave the system. Because the cost remains basically the same and
there are fewer customers, the IOU must raise rates to the remaining
customers in order to recoup its initial investment. Otherwise, the
shareholders of the IOU must bear the burden of the investment, even
though the IOU was required to make the investment in generation to meet
the demand of its service territory.1'
The issue of stranded costs in the Las Cruces case has already been
considered by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).Y As a
municipal utility that will resell electricity to its customers, Las Cruces will
qualify as a wholesale buyer of electricity. Thus, the transfer of the facilities
will be governed by federal law and overseen by FERC. Under FERC's
Order No. 888,1" a utility is entitled to recover stranded costs based on the

192. See Christensen, supra note 191. Despite the advances, EPE has nonetheless
determined that it will need "100 percent of its transmission capacity to provide reliable
service to its retail customers." Cruces May Have to Build Own Plants,ALBUQUERQUE J., Aug.
28,1998, at E3.
193. For a more complete explanation of stranded costs, see Doane &Macavoy, supra note
15.
194. See Christensen, supra note 191.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. FERC staff said that Las Cruces would owe EPE $29.4 million based on FERC's 10year planning period policy. See Court Jolts El Paso Electric, supra note 178.
198. PromotingWholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-DiscriminatoryTransmission
Sericesby PublicUtilities; Reme of Stranded Costs by Public Utilitiesand TransmittingUtilities,
61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35,385) thereinafter Order No. 888.
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in hopes of taking advantage of the growing Southwest economy.' The oil
embargo in the 1970s resulted in a decrease in the demand for electricity,
however, as Americans began employing conservation measures to
decrease their dependence on foreign oil. Moreover, although EPE's other
investments grew initially, the bottom eventually fell out of the Southwest's real estate market and the savings and loan industry collapsed.' At
about the same time, the Palo Verde Project became increasingly costly to
operate. Extended shutdowns forced EPE to purchase expensive replacement power.1' 7 Bad investments and the Palo Verde Project eventually
forced EPE to file for bankruptcy in 19 9 2 .1"Central and Southwest Power
Company (CSW), a neighboring IOU, agreed to bail out EPE under a
proposed $2.2 billion merger agreement set up in 1993.76 The merger
agreement died, however, after Las Cruces residents voted two to one to
oust EPE as the electric provider in favor of establishing a municipal

utility.17
EPE's financial difficulties resulted in higher than average rates for
its customers. 78 To escape those rates, Las Cruces decided to try to break
from EPE."' Although it contemplated leaving EPE's system in the 1980s,

172. Like other utilities in the Southwest, EPE was investing in the then booming
southwestern real estate market. See Leah Beth Ward, A Reckoningfor the Utility High Rollers,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 29, 1990, at C4. EPE and other IOUs began diversifying out of fear that
regulators might force them to relinquish their profits. Paying out the profits as dividends
would cause the size of the companies to shrink so investment seemed the only way to protect
the profits. See id.
173. See id.
174.

See id.

175. See El Paso Electric Seeks Chapter11 Protection,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9,1992, at D4. EPE's
debt at the time of filing bankruptcy totaled about $900 million. See Making A Difference. A
Tu-Year Baptism ofFireat El Paso Electric, N.Y. TIMES, Dec, 8,1991, at C14. When EPE filed for
bankruptcy in 1992, it became only the second utility to do so since the Depression. See Central
and South West's El Paso Deal Is Threatened, N.Y. TIME, Sept. 14,1994, at D3.
176. See New Doubts on El Paso Electric's Merger Plan, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,1995, at D3.
177. See Utility Kills MergerDeal, ALBUQUERQUE J., June 10,1995, at Al. See also Denise
Warkentin, Las Cruces Voters Approve Municipalization,ELECMC LIGHT AND POWER, Oct. 1994,
at 1.Other factors also contributed to the failure of the merger deal including allegations that
EPE was promoting a stand-alone reorganization plan. See New Doubts,supra note 176.
178. Residential electric rates for a majority of New Mexico utilities rank among the most
expensive 20 percent nationwide. See CourtJolts El Paso Electric,ALBUQUERQUE J., Feb. 13,1998,
at C4. In addition, EPE charges 10.6 cents per kilowatt hour (kWh) compared to Public Service
Company of New Mexico at 9.3 cents per kWh, Texas New Mexico Power Company at 8.4
cents per kWh, and Southwestern Public Service at 6.4 cents per kWh. See Michael G. Murphy,
Las Cruces Utility TakeoverApproved, ALBUQUERQUE J., Apr. 12,1997, at C4.
179. EPE's high rates caused problems for the people living in Las Cruces in more than
one way. Not only did its citizens have to pay the higher rates, those rates created a barrier
to potential incoming industry for the area, an area plagued by high unemployment and low
wages. See Michael G. Murphy, Las CrucesPowerStruggle May End, ALBUQUERQUE J., Apr. 7,
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Las Cruces could not find a way to do it until its 25 year franchise
agreement with EPE expired in 1993.11 In 1996, EPE came out of bankruptcy protection."' Las Cruces attempted to negotiate a sale price with
EPE for the facilities lying within the city limits from 1990 until 1995, to no
avail."e In 1994, Las Cruces passed a referendum to acquire an electric
utility system. 3
As of August 1998, the condemnation proceeding was in federal
district court. In 1996 the district court certified to the New Mexico
Supreme Court the issue of whether a municipality's power of eminent
domain extends to electric utility facilities.' Arguments were heard in
February of 19 9 7 .wsAfter the New Mexico legislature enacted amendments
to the New Mexico PUA, however, the court determined that the issue
was moot, quashed its earlier certification, and sent the case back to the
district court.1 7 The condemnation issue is now before the United States
District Court. However, the issue is no longer whether Las Cruces has the
legal authority to condemn, but rather how much Las Cruces should pay
for the facilities. " EPE argues that Las Cruces should pay $170 million,
while staff at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission estimate Las
Cruces owes $29.4 million.'
C. Applying United Water to the Las Cruces Municipalization
Effects on Stranded Costs
Now that Las Cruces has the legal authority to condemn the
electric facilities within its borders, the court's task is to determine how
much Las Cruces must pay for the facilities. As with Rio Rancho's
condemnation of RRUC's facilities, the court does not consider whether the

1997, at Al.

180. See Dale Chaney, Las Cruces Pushes Fightfor Own Utility, ALBUQUERQUE J., Mar. 20,
1995, at Business Outlook 5.
181. See Robertson, supra note 169.
182. See R.W. Beck, City of Las Cruces Severance Plan, § 1, Executive Summary at 1, City
of Las Cruces v. El Paso Electric Co., 904 F. Supp. 1238,1257 (1995).

183. See City of Las Cruces v. El Paso Electric Co., 954 P.2d 72,74 (N.M. 1998) [hereinafter
Las Cruces in.
184. See City of Las Cruces v. El Paso Electric Co., 904 F. Supp. 1238,1257 (D.N.M. 1995)
[hereinafter Las Cruces I).
185.

See Murphy, supranote 171, at Al.

186. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-24-1(E)-(G), 42A-3-1(A)(8) (Michie Cur. Supp. 1997).
187.

See Las Cruces 11, 954 P.2d at 79.

188. See Murphy, supranote 178.
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utility's "reasonable expectation" of service to the customer or customers
leaving the system.' FERC's determination could be the end of the
inquiry. However, some states have opted to address the issue of stranded
costs separately. For example, California recently opened its electric system
to retail wheeling. Since then, the California PUC has established guidelines for establishing a competitive transition charge to be paid by
customers leaving the incumbent utility's system.' In New Mexico there
is no similar provision and the legislature has only begun to address the
issue of competition in the electric industry.'
Because EPE is already in bankruptcy, it is unlikely that it will be
able to bear the additional costs if Las Cruces leaves the system. However,
the PUC has the power to control EPE's rates and therefore could keep
them at their present levels.' Determining who would then pay the
additional costs is difficult. Possibly, EPE would have to decrease its
service quality to the remaining customers. The PUC also oversees quality
of service, however, and has a duty to assure that quality is not impaired.'
By providing the PUC with jurisdiction over the condemnation proceedings, it could take these costs into consideration when determining whether
or not to approve the transfer of the facilities and when assisting in the
determination of how much should be paid.
On the other hand, the New Mexico legislature has already spoken
to the issue of the Las Cruces condemnation proceedings. It expressly
provided Las Cruces with the power to condemn the local electric facilities.
The narrow reach of the law indicates that the legislature wanted to
provide Las Cruces with this power in this situation. Even though the
remaining EPE customers in New Mexico will likely bear an additional
burden of EPE's poor investing, the legislative process is not one we like to
question or criticize. However, the PUC does have expertise in the area of
utility regulation and so should have some oversight of the process.
The issue of "stranded costs" has been at the heart of the retail
wheeling debate for years. Questions of who will pay for the investments
made by IOUs - the remaining customers, the leaving customers, or the
investors - continues to be hashed out between IOUs and electric customers. The federal government has already provided for full, stranded cost
recovery for the IOUs that it governs. Some states have already provided

199. For a more complete analysis of "stranded costs" and the pitfalls of the "reasonable
expectation" standard, see Doane & Spulber, supranote 4.
200. See Doane & Macavoy, supranote 15, at 10-12 & n.4.
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that customers leaving the system must pay a certain fee to the IOU whose
system they are leaving.' By allowing a municipality like Las Cruces to
leave EPE's system without considering the economic effects on other areas
served by EPE, it almost guarantees rate increases or other problems for the
remaining customers and the investors. The problem does not necessarily
have to be resolved by the PUC; the legislature may address it specifically
in electric utility law reform. However, until it does, the courts should, for
policy reasons, provide the PUC with an opportunity to consider the effects
a condemnation could have outside the city limits of the condemning

municipality.
CONCLUSION
The United Water decision provides excellent support for the old
adage, "what is sauce for the goose is not always sauce for the gander."
Despite its dependence on a questionable distinction between voluntary
and involuntary actions by a utility, the court most likely reached the result
envisioned and anticipated by the legislature. Moreover, the decision was
likely the best result considering the nature of water utilities. By allowing
Rio Rancho to control its water, the court in effect gave Rio Rancho the
power to control its development, both in terms of rate of growth and type
of development. With that added power comes added risk which the City
alone must bear.
However, like many decisions, the reach of United Water may
extend beyond the water and sewage areas into areas where the result is
not as appropriate. As in the case of water utility, control over a local
electric utility and electric rates provides cities the power to control growth
and the economy. Thus, cities are given the opportunity to control their
own destinies. However, that ability comes at a greater price in the electric
industry. When Las Cruces leaves EPE's electric system, the risks will not
be borne by the city alone. The remaining EPE customers will be forced to
bear a greater percentage of the cost of the Palo Verde plant and other
failed investments. Those customers will most likely have to pay increased
rates for the same service they are presently provided. The PUC was
established to look out for the public's interest regarding public utilities in
just this type of case. It was designed to assure quality public services at
reasonable prices for all customers. The courts should, therefore, allow the
Commission to fulfill its statutorily mandated duties by providing it with
the jurisdiction to oversee Las Cruces' condemnation of EPE's systems.
THOMAS SMIDT I

204. See Doane & Macavoy, supra note 15, at 10-12 & n.4.

